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Torre II.
C0l\1MENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES.
What regulations should be made in regard to the
commencement of hostilities?
REGULATIONS.
ARTICLE 1. Hostilities between the contracting po·wers
must not con11nence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war
or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.
ART. 2. The state of ·war 1nust be notified to the neutral
powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard
to them until after the receipt of a notification, which
may even be given by telegraph. Neutral powers, nevertheless, can not plead the absence of notification if it is
established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware
of the state of war.
ART. 3. Article 1 of the present convention shall take
effect in case of war between two or more of the contracting powers. A.rticle 2 is binding as between a belligerent
power ·which is a party to the convention and neutral
powers which are also parties to the convention.
:NOTES.

lntrod?-tction.-Certain aspects of the subject of declaration of war were considered in the International Law
Situations of this Naval War College in the conference
o£ 1910, and appear in the publication of that year as
Situation II, pages 45 to 65. It was then shown that no
unifor1nity of practice had prevailed in regard to time,
method, or £orin of declaration, that there were reason'3
why some regulation should prevail for the declaration,
and that The Hague conference of 1907 had tried to meet
this need in the convention relative to the opening of
hostilities.
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H a.gue convention 190'7, opening of hostilities.-Tiv~
Hague ~onference of 1907 considered the question of the
opening of hostilities, both from the point of view of the
belligerent and of the neutral. The result of the long
and careft-il discussion \Vas a convention, of which the following are the essential articles:
ARTICLE 1. The contracting powers recognize that hostilities
between themselves must not commence without previous and
explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war,
giving reasons, or of an ultimatum, with a conditional declaration
of war.

This convention has now been adopted by most of
the larger states of the world.
The understanding of its significance as presented to
the Secretary of State by the American delegates is showll
in the following staten1ent from their official report:
The convention is very short, and is based upon the principle
that neither belligerent should be taken by surprise, and that the
neutral shnll not be bound to the performance of neutral duties
until it has received notification, even if only by telegram, of the
outbreak of war. The means of notification is considered unimportant, for if the neutral knows, through whatever means or
whatever channels. of the existence of war, it can not claim a
formal notification from the belligerents before being taxed with
neutral obligations. While the importance of the convention to
prospective belligerents p1ay be open to doubt, it is clear that it
does safeguard in a very high degree the rights of neutrals, and
specifies authoritatively the exact moment when the duty of neutrality begins. It is for this reason that the American delegation
supported the project and signed the convention. (60th Con g.,
1st sess., S. Doc. 444, p. 34.)

It is to be observed that this convention establishes the
principle that the declaration shall be previous to the
opening of hostilities, but does not state how long before
the opening of hostilities the declaration should be made.
The propositions made for fixing a specified time bet~een
the declaration of war and the opening of hostilities did
not receive sufficient support in the conference to secure
adoption. The committee concerned particularly with
the formulation of the rules for the opening of hostilities
called attention to the fact that the Institute. of International La\v in 1906 had not been able to agree upon a
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period for delay between declaration and opening of hostilities, even when sitting in an unofficial capacity. The
essential point is that th~ declaration shall be previous to
the opening of hostilities.
Recent declarations.-Recent declarations of war show
the necessity for definite regulations. The date of the
commence1nent of the Spanish-American War of 1898
gave rise to n1any questions, some of which were taken
t0 the Supreme Court of the United States.
Spanish-American 1Var declaration, !1-pril ~5, 1898.According to the Constitution of the United States (Art.
I, sec. 8, n.) Congress has po·wer "to declare war."
On April 19, 1898, Congress passed the following:
Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the
people of Cuba , demanding that the GoYernment of Spain relinquish its authority and goYernment in the island of Cuba, and
to withdraw its land and naYal forces from Cuba and Cuban
waters, and directing the President of the United States to use
the land and nayal forces of the United States to carry these
resolutions into effect.
Resolv ed by the Senate and I-I ouse of Representatives of the
United States of A.merica in Congress assembled, First, That the

people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free
and independent.
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand,
and the GoYernment of the United States does hereby demand,
that the Goyernment of Spain at once relinquish its authority
and goYernment in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land
and nava l forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.
r.rhird. That the President of the United States be, and he
ht'reby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual
service of the United States the militia of the seYeral States,
t o such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions
into effect.
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposit ion or intention to exercise soyereignty, jurisdiction, or control
oYer said island except· for the pacification thereof, and asserts
its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the go"\""ernment and control of the island to its people.
ApproYed April 20, 1898. (Foreign Relations U. S., 1898, p.
765.)

This resolution was ilnn1ediately dispatched to the
.A.merican minister to Spain, ·with an ulti1natuin.

SPANISH--~LHEIUCAN
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JJ1r. Sherman to j;Jr. Woodford.
[Telegram.]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, April 20, 1898.
You have been furnished with the text of a joint resolution
voted by the Congress of the United States on the 19th i~stant
(approved to-day) in relation to the pacification of the island of
Cuba. In obedience to that act, the President directs you to
immediately communicate to the Government of Spain said resolution, with the formal demand of the Government of the "Cnited
States that the Government of Spain at once re1inquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and Cuban waters.
In taking this step the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the
government and control of the island to its people under such
ftee and independent govern1nent as they may establish.
If, by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23rd day of April,
instant, there be not communicated to this Government by that
of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and
resolution, whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured,
the President' will proceed without further notice to use the
power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the
said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry
the same into effect.
SHERMAN.

(Ibid, p. 764.)

Before J\1r. ""\Voodford had delivered the con1n1un1cation to the Spanish Government, the Spanish 1ninister
o£ state sent to Mr. vVood£ord the £ollo-\ving note:
In compliance with a painful duty, I ha Ye the honor to inform
your excellency that, the President having app1·oved a resolution
of both Cha1pbers cf the United , States which, in denying the
legitimate sovereignty of Spain and in threatening armed intervention in Cubu, is equin1lent to an evident declaration of war,
the Government of His l\fajesty has ordered its 111inister in Washington to withdra'v without loss l f time from the North . .-\.mericau
.
territory with all the personnel of the legation. By this act the
diplonmtic relations which previously existed between the two
countries are broken off, all official communication between their
respective rep'resentatives ceasing; and I hasten to communicate
this to your excellency in order that on your part you may make
such dispositions as seem suitable. (Ibid, p. 767.)
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''Toodford then (-A.pr. 21, 1898) requested his pass-

ports and "'\Yithdre'v fron1 Spain.
Spain on April 21, 1898, at 7.30 a. n1. had stated that
the threat of intervention in Cuba "is equivalent to an
evident. declaration of war."
The Spanish 1ninister at ashington had requested his
passports on .A.. pril 20 at about noon. ~1r. 'Voodford
had been instructed on i\._pril 20 to remain near the Spanish Court in his capacity of 1ninister till noon of the 23d
of ...._<\_pril unless previously handed his passports; and he
did re1nain~ and diploinatic relations 'vere continued till
the n1orning of ...._c\_pril 21.
..:\. blockade of Cuban ports 'vas -proclain1ed on 1-\._ pril 22.
On . A. pril 23, 1898, the Queen Regent of Spain issued
a decree announcing the existence of war and declaring
the ter1nination of the treaties " and all other agreen1ents, compacts, and conventions that have been in force
up to the present between the two countries."
On ..._-\.._pril 25, 1898, Congress, exercising its constitutional authority, passed the following act:

''T

First. Thn t wnr be. and the same is hereby. declared to exist,
and that wnr has existed since the twenty-first day of April, nnno
Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day,
beh\een the United Stn tes of America nnd the Kingdom of Spain.
Second. That the President of the United States be. and he
hereby is. directed and empowered to use the entire land and
naYal forces of the United State~. and to call into the actual
serYice of the United States the militia of the seYeral States, to
such extent as may be necessary to carry this net into effect.
(30 Stat.~ 36-±.)
B~T

this act of . A. pril 23 'var existed during the day of
April 21 and fro1n that ti1ne. By the Spanish decree
treaty relations "~ere superseded by 'v~u· on .1-\._pril 28; in
fact, diplo1natic exchanges had taken place on April 21.
The Supre1ne Court of the United States acknowledged that war had e_x isted since and including 1-\._pril 21,
and that captures subsequent to that day ·were valid.
This was two days pr·ior to the Spanish decree_ and four
days prior to the J-\._Inerican declaration.
On the 25th of April President Thicl(inley, recognizing
that the posi.ti.on of the lTnited States ·was not 'vell de-.

fined, said in a communication to Congress, referring to
the position of the Spanish Government as stated in the
note to the American minister at ~1adrid :
It will be perceived therefrom that the Go-vernment of Spain,
having cognizance of the joint resolution of the United S tate~
Congress, and in view of the things which the President is thereby
required and authorized to do, responds by treating the rea sonable
demauds of this Government as measures of hostility! following
with that instant and complete severance of relations bJ~ its action
which by the usage of nations accompanies an existent state of
war between sovereign powers.
The position of Spain being thus made known and the denulnds
of the united States being denied with a complete rupture of
intercourse by the act of Spain, I haYe been constrained, in exercise of the power and authority conferred upon n1e by the joint
resolution aforesaid, to proclaim under date of April 22. 1898, a
blockade of certain ports of the north coast of Cuba, lying between Cardenas and Bahia I-Ionda and of the port of Cienfuegos
on the south coast of Cuba; and further, in exercise of m~~ constitutional powers and using the authority conferred upon me by
the act of Congress approYed April 22, 1898, to issue tny proclamation. dated April 23, 1898, calling forth volunteers in order to
carry into effect the said resolution of .April 20, 1898. Copies of
these proclamations Pr.re hereto appended.
In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the adoption of such other measures as may be necessary to enable me to
carry out the exvressell will of the Congress of the United States
in the premises, I now ~recommend to your honorable body the
adoption of a joint resolution declaring that a state of war exists
between the United States of America and the Kingdon1 of Spain,
·and I urge speedy action thereon. to the end thrr t the definition
of the international status of the United States as a belligerent
power may be made known. and the assertion of all its right~
and the maintenance of all its duties in the conduct of a public
war may be assured. (Foreign Relations "C. S., 1898, p. 771. )

From this it is plain that the status was not defined
and assured until after the declaration, though the declaration issued on the 25th of April was held to define the
status existing as regards the belligerent rights of the
United States subsequent to the 20th o~ ...~pril. Under
such conditions complications naturally arise not only as
regards relations of belligerents but also as regards
neutrals. ,
Under the provisions of The Hague convention there
is required before commencement of hostilities a " pre-
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vious and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war giving reasons or of an ultimatum with
a conditional declaration of war."
In 1898 Congress did not formally declare war until
after the opening of hostilities, for a blockade was declared on April 22, 1898. This act of Congress was unquestionably legal under the Constitution of the United
States, though it would not now be regarded as in accord
'vith the convention relative to the opening of hostilities.
Even if Congress had not declared war at all, it would
certainly have existed after the Spanish decree o.f April
23. vVhether without declaration war would have existed
on April 21 is open to question. Whether the signing
of the convention relative to the opening of hostilities
has in any way limited the· powers of Congress under
the Constitution is a question that might be raised. However, as the United States has become a party to this convention, it is, as regards foreign states signatories to the
convention, bound by its provisions. A failure to observe
the provisions of the conYention would render the United
States liable.
Further, it is sufficient to say that in a change so far
reaching in its effects as a change fro1n state of- peace
to a state of war, it is only reasonable that the time of
the change should be unequivocally known both to the
opposing belligerent and to neutrals.
Tl~e ~dtimatum of the South African Republic, 1899.At the -time of the strained relations between the South
African Republic and Great Britain, in 1899, the Republic issued an ulti1n~tum showing that it regarded
concentration of forces near its borders as an act of war.
.._\fter relating many grounds for action, the ultimatum
says:
Her :Majesty's unlawful interyention in the internal affairs of
this Republic in conflict with the convention of London, 1884,
caused by the extraordinary strengthening of troops in the neighborhood of the borders of tbis Republic, has thus caused an intolerable condition of things to arise whereto this Government
feels itself obliged, in the interest not only of this Republic, but
also of an South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and
feels itself caned upon and obliged to press earnestly and with
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emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things
and to request I-Ier J.\IIajesty's Government to give it the assurance( a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by
the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way
may be agreed upon by this Government with Her :Majesty's
Government.
(b) Tba t the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be
instantly withdrawn.
(c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in
South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from
South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon :with
this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee
on the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities
against any portion of the possessions of the British Government
shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within
a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the
Governinents, and this Government will, on compliance therewith, ·be prepared to wJthdra w the armed burghers of this Republic from the borders.
(d) That Her :Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas
shall not be landed in any port of South Africa.
This Government must press for an immediate and affirn1ative
answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her J\Iajesty's Government to return such an answer before or npon Wednesday, the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock p. m., and
it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no
satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval it
will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her
l\fajesty's Government. as a formal declaration of war, and will
not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that
in the event of any. further n10vements of troops taking place
within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of onr
borders this Government will be compelled to regard that also as
a formal declaration of war.

The reply o:f Great Britain was short and war was held
to exist at once:
Her J\fajesty's Government have received with great regret the
peremptory demands of the Government of the South African
Republic conveyed in your telegram of 9th October, No. 3. You
will inform the Government of the South _African Republic, in reply, that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South
African Republic are such as Her J\Iajesty's Government deem it
impossible to discuss.

Russo-Japanese lVar, 1904.-Tbe Japanese declaration
of war against Russia was published on February 10,

62

CO.l\G\IENCE:L\iENT OF HOSTILITIES.

1904. The Russian reply was published on the same
date. The Ekaterinoslav and JJJ ukden, Russian steamships, were captured with their cargoes on February 6.
Other steamships ·were captured on February 7. On February 8 the Japanese torpedo boats attacked the Russian
fleet at Port Arthur. On the 9th other engagements took
place and captures \Vere 1nade. Therefore the war was in
full progress before any declaration was issued by either
Japan or Russia. A decision of the Japanese court in
the case of the Ekaterinoslav_ vvas to the effect that war
existed from the time of the sailing of the Japanese fleet
from Sasebo at 7 a. m. on February 6. Thus the RussoJapanese war began about four days before the declaration was made, and it was legal war from that time.
"The war commenced when the Japanese fleet left Sasebo
with an intention of attacking the Russian fleet."
There was much discussion of these acts, and Russia
entered a strong protest, and the Japanese Govern1nent
replied. It is certain that it was not generhlly kno·wn
that war had commenced when the fleet sailed on February 6, and it was not even known that the fleet had
sailed. An ele1nent of uncertainty therefore existed.
Turco-! talian War, 191.1.-It was announced in Ron1e
late in September, 1911, that the Italian charge d'affaires
at Constantinople had been authorized to present an ultimatum to the Turki.sh Government, stating the grievances and demands of Italy. This ccmmunication vvas
of the nature of an ultimatum with a conditional declaration of war. As both Italy and Turkey had participated
in the conference at The Hague in 1907, these States vvere
naturally familiar with the convention relative to the
opening of hostilities. There was, therefore, an attempt
on the part of Italy to conform to the provisions of the
convention. This is shown in the ulti1natum:
During a long series of years the Government of Italy never
ceased to make representations to the Porte upon the absolute
necessity of correcting the state of disorder to which the Government of Turkey had abandoned Tripoli and Cyrene. These regions should be admitted to the benefits of the progress realized
by other parts of the 1\iediterranean and Africa.

TURCO-ITALIAN WAR, 1911.
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r. rhis transformation which is imposed by the general exigencies
of civilization constitutes for Italy a vital interest of the first
order by reason of the slight distance separating these countries
from the coasts of Italy. Notwithstanding the attitude taken by
the Government of Italy, which has always accorded its loyal
support to the Imperial Government in the different political
questions of recent times; notwithstanding the moderation and
patience shown by the Government of Italy; its views concerning Tripoli have been badly received by the Imperial GoYernment,
but more than that, all enterprises on the part of Italians in the
regions mentioned have been systematically opposed and unjustifiably crushed.
The Imperial Government, which to the present time ha s shown
constant hostility toward all legitin1ate Italian actiYity in Tripoli
and Cyrene, quite recently, at the eleventh hour, proposes to the
Ro:ral Government to come to an understanding, declaring itself
disposed to grant any economic concession compatible with
treaties in force and with the higher dignity and interests of
Turks; but the Royal Government does not now feel itself in a
position to enter such negotiations, the uselessnesR of which bas
been demonstrate9- by past experience and which far from constituting a guarantee for the future, would be themselves permanent cnnses of disagreement and conflict.
The Royal Government has receiYed from its consular agents in
Tripoli and Cyrene information that the situation is extremely
grave because of the agitation prevailing against Italian subjects,
and which is evidently incited by officers and other functionaries
of authority.
'l'his agitation constitutes an imminent danger, not only to
Italian subjects, but to foreigners of all nationalities, which requires them, for their own security, to embark and leave Tripoli
without delay.
The arrival at Tripoli of Ottoman military transports, which
the Royal Government bas not failed to obserYe, appears preliminary to serious events, aggravates the situation, and imposes on.
the Royal GoYernment the obligation absolutely to prepare for the
dangers which will result.
The ItaliDn Governn1ent, having the intention henceforth to protect its interests and its dignity, bas decided to proceed to the
military occupation of. Tripoli and Cyrene.
This solution is the only one that will give Italy power to itself
decide and itself attend to that which the Imperial Government
doe~ not do.
The Royal Government demands that the Imperial Government
shrill giYe ord~r that the actual Ottoman representative shall not
oppose the measure which will, in consequence, be necessary to
effect this solution without difficulty. An ultimate agreement will
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be requested between the two Governments to regulate the defi:r;littj
siuation which will arise.
The royal embassy at Constantinople is ordered to demand a
decisive response on this subject from the Ottoman Government
within 24 hours of the presentation to the Porte of the present
document, in default of which the Italian Government will consider itself as being obliged to proceed immediately with measures
destined to assure the occupation. Ask, in addition, that the
response of the Porte within the pedod of 24 hours shall· be cOinmunicated also through 'Turkish embassy at Rome.

The reply of Turkey to the Italian ultimatum, though
conciliatory, 'vas not regarded by Italy as satisfactory.
The following is the text of the declaration handed to
the Porte by the Italian embassy:
Can·3ring out the orders of the King, the charge d'affaires of
Italy has the honor to notify that the period accorded by the
Royal Governn1ent to the Porte with a view to the realization of
certain necessary measures has expired without a satisfactory
reply reaching the Italian Government.
The lack of this repl3r only confirms the bad will or want of
power of which the Turkisl.l Government aiid authorities have
given such frequent proof, especially with regard to the rights
and interests of Italians in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
The Royal Government is consequently obliged to attend itself
to the safeguarding of its rights and interests as well as its
honor and dignity by all means at its disposal.
The events which will follow can only be regarded as the
necessary consequences of the conduct followed for so long by the
Turkish a n thori ties.
The rein tions of friendship and peace being therefore interr upted between the two countries, Italy considers herself from
this m ~ ment in a state of war with Turkey.
The undersigned consequently has the honor to make known
to your highness that passports will be placed at the disposal of
the charge d'affaires in Rome, and to beg your highness to hand
him his own passp ::; rts.
The Royal Government has likewise commissioned the undersigned to declare that Ottoman subjects may continue to reside
in Italy without fear of an attack on their persons, property, or
affairs.
DE 1\iARTINO.
September 29, 1911.

As Italy considered a state of war as existing, a definite
hour from which this should date was announced, VIZ~
2.30 p. m., September 29, 1911.

Ho~r E. 8cpt e111uer 2.9, J911.
It is t fficia11y nnuonncell that, the Ottoman GoYernment having failed to meet the demands contained in the Italian ultin1a tum,
Imly and Turkey .. are in a state of war from lmlf-rmst two
in the afternoon of to-cl<l~~. September 29.''
,,.l'he Italian GoYernment 'vill proYicle for the safety alike of
Italians and foreigners of all nationalities in Tripoli and Cyrennica hy all ine ms at its disposal.
~\ blocknde of the entire const of Tripoli and Cyrenaica will
be immediately notified to the neutral po,yers.

Lin~itation

of r·u les.-While the rules of the convention
of 1007 1nake the previous and explicit declaration of 'var
obligatory upon the contracting states~ there are circumstances under 'Yhich "Tar 1nay arise 'vithont declaration.
Under such circtunstances .the early p1·inciples will preYaiL and a subsequent declaration 111ay deter111ine when
\Yar legally begins or the beginning 1nay be inferred from
the first act of hostilities. \\Then one of the parties to the
"rar is not a party to The Hague convention such a condition 1night arise. In case of civil "~ar the ordinary conditions would be such as to render a declaration if not unnecessary at least unusual. The early rules "rill therefore still be applicable to certain cases, even if those of
1007 are generally adopted.
Fo1 m of declaration of war as regards belligerents.That war should not co1nmence 'vithout a forn1al declaration 'Yas recognized practice an1ong the ancients. In
the :Nlicldle ~\.ge5l three days' notice 'vas son1eti1nes required. Heralds vvere sent in advance ever after the
days of Grotius~ during the early part of the seventeenth
century. Fro1n the beginning of the eighteenth century
the practice 'yas Yaried, by far the larger nu1nber of 'vars
haYing been begun 'vithout previous declaration.
'"rhe recall of diplo111atic agents has been the usual prelin1inary act of the government. indicating that relations
are strained to such an extent that \Yar may soon follow~.
but 'var does not necessarily follo'v, as the difference bet,Yeen the states 1nay be adjusted. T'he nature of the
diplo111atic negotiations or of discussions in the parlial11ents 111ay indicate that 'var is threatening~ but none of
these evidence:s constitutes a declaration of war.
1
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An ultimatun1 Inay be iss~1ed containing a demand for
satisfaction. Such an ultimatum is usually formulated
in diplomatic terms, \Yhich would not n1ake it t oo difficult
for the state to vvhich it is dispatched to find a way to
adjust the difficulties. The ulti1natun1 usually fixes the
tim~ vvithin which an answer n1ust be 1nade. The U nited
States required that Spain reply to its demand for withdrawal of Spanish forces from Cuba within three days;
i. e., by April 23. War was declared on April 25. An
ultin1atun1 in itself does not necessarily involve a declara tion of vvar unless the failure to comply with the demands
carries vYith it a conditional declaration of vvar.
The British de1nands upon Venezuela in 1902 required
an i1nmediate satisfaction of certain clain1s, and concluded: " This con1munication must be regarded in the
light of ultimatun1." The failure of Venezuela to satisfy
these clai1ns did not lead to an in1mediate war, but to an
atte1npt to establish a pacific blockade vvhich subsequently
took the form of a true blockade.
vVhatever the preliminary negotiations or evidences of
strained relations which might have received considerabon prior to 1907, a1nong those states now parties to the
con vent ion relative to the opening of hostilities, it is now
necessary that there be a previous and explicit warning.
This previous and explicit warning may take the f orm
of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ult imatum with
a conditional declaration of war.
The reasoned declaration of war was regarded by many
as necessary or at least very desirable because the opposing belligerent should be given a formal stat ement of the
grounds of the vvar and the neutrals should not suffer
such great changes in their ordinary rights and obliga. tions without knowledge of the reasons.
If instead of the reasoned declaration of war, the ultimatum with conditional declaration vvas employed, the
reasons for the breaking off of peaceful relations would
.
be stated in the ultimatum.
T he exact wording of the declaration or ultimatum
would na turally vary according to circumstances, but
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should be previous and explicit. That the beginning of
.a status -w hich changes the legal and other relations of
states and individuals and introduces risks and obligations where none had previously existed should be clearly
-d.efined scarcely needs argtunent. The possibility of injustice to innocent parties has been very great under the
old system of uncertainty which prevailed under the
·doctrine that war commenced 'vith the first act of hostility 'vhen there was no -vvay of defining 'vhat constituted
.an act of hostility.
Col. Tinge, of the Chinese delegation at the Second
Hague Conference, 1907, said that it would be serviceable
to define the term war, f or under the name of expeditions there .had been numerous examples of invasions of
his country.
Oom.m encement of hostilities.-The Hague convention
provides "the contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not comn1ence without previous and explicit warning."
The discussions at The Hague in 1907 show that " previous " simply means before in time, but does not imply
that any specified period of priority is involved.
There is in the convention no definition as to "]'hat constitutes the commencement of hostilities before 'vhich ex_plicit wa rning must be given.
D r . J . ~1. Spaight , writ ing in 1910, says:
It is, of course, the aggressor who is bound t o n1ake th e formal
declaration of war. E very nation ha s the right to defend itself
-from a t tack. Continental jurists, while requiring a declaration
fron1 the belligerent who takes offensive a ction , ad1nit tha t it is
·n ot required from the party repelling a hostile enterprise. Blunts chli a.dds that a defensive war may necessa rily have, fo r military
Tensons, to take the form of offense. "From the point of view
·of law the difference between the offensive and defensive w ar lies
not in the fact of being the first to cross the fron tiers or invade
the hostile territory, lJut in the difference of the respective rights
-of the parties." Hence he would dispense with a declaration
where the threatened belligerent forestalls his adversary in self·d efense. The doctrine is a dangerous one; aggressors are usually
...able to satisfy themselves that they are acting on the defensive.
B luntschli's view has no warranty in the convention of 1907. The

68

CO:.\C\IE~

CE:.\IE1\ T OF HOSTILITIES.

belligerent who strikes first, whether he is really acting on the
defensiYe and bis aggression is merely a tactical mode of self-protection or not, is bound to giYe notice. as lnicl down in the first
article. (War Rights on Land, p. 24.)

. .A. . state "\vhose frontier adjoined a state "\Vith which it
had had or might have difficulties might double the number of troops along this frontier. It Inight assemble all
its troops along this frontier. \Vould this be the coinInenceinent of hostilities? \Vould the other state be justified in regarding this as an act of 'var? If both states
are parties to the conYention and "\Var follo'.YS, "\vould
the state placed at a disadvantage by the assembling of
its opponent troops on the frontier have a right to maintain that the convention had been violated?
If the naval forces of a state had been similarly assen1bled in an advantageous position, "\Vould this be the
con11nence1nent of hostilities? The asse1nbling of the
vessels Inay be of yastly 1nore ·weight than the firing of
guns in the determination of the issue if war arises.
Such being the case in regard to Inany acts on land
and sea whieh Inay be in the nature of veiled threats,
there ahvays rmnains the right of the state against which
the threat is directed to den1and in an ultimation given
rf'asons, the "\vithdrawal of the threatening force, or even
to de1nand that the forces be not assmnbled in such a
rnanner as to be a threat. Of such action each state
n1nst be judge. ri'here is nothing in the principles of
international la"\Y "\vhich "\Vonld forbid the placing of its
troops in any part of its own territory or the 1nove1nents
of fleets in any direction on the seas.
As "\vas sho,vn in the International La"\v Situations in
1910, pages 45 to 65, there 1nay be conditions uncler "\Yhich
the principles recognized previous to 1907 ·would prevail as in civil "\var, "\Yhen the first act involving the use
of 1nilitary force n1ay be regarded as the con11nence111ent of hostilities and the opening of "\Var. In case of
strained relations bebveen states the perfonnance or
failure to perforn1 an act specified in an ultin1ahun or in
a conditional declaration of "\Var 1nay be regarcled as the
beginning of a state of -vvar.
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florn-u of declaration as regards neutrals.-The rule of
'_fhe Hague convention relative to the opening of hostili6es provides:
The existence of n st:tte of war mnst be notified to the neutral
powers without delay.

That the belligerent 1nay not be negligent in making
this notification, it is further p~ovided that the obligation of neutrality co~1sequent upon the existence of a
state of \var "shall not take effect in regard to them
until after the receipt of a notification, \vhich may, however, be given by telegraph."
Certain possibilities of co1nplications are introduced
by the added clause:
Xeutra l powers, neyertheless, can not rely on the absence of
notificn tion H it is clenrly established that they were in fnct
aware of the existence of a state of war.

It is presumed that the burden of proof of the notification of the existence of a state of war \vould be upon
the belligerent, and such proof might be difficult to
establish.
There \Vere at The Hague conference in 1907 several
propositions looking to the establishing of a period o:f
tin1e after notification to the neutral during which period
the obligations of neutrality should not be operative.
The Belgian delegate suggested that the obligations of
neutrality should becon1e operative 48 hours after the
receipt of the notification of the existence of war. It \Vas
pointed out that this n1ight give occasion to the idea
that neutrals might during this period act with i1npunity
in a manner contrary to the obligations of neutrality.
It n1ight further be said that if the neutral is to be allowed a period after the notification in which neutral
obligations shall not he binding, the aim of the belligerent on the offensive would be to have this period at
such a time as ·w ould be of least advantage to his opponent. This question \Vould: therefore, becon1e one entering into the belligerent's considerations in determining
the ti1ne of 'the declaration of war. As the belligerent
'vould ordinarily wish to engage his opponent before he
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had had tin1e to prepare, and as a period o£ free coinInerce with a neutral would add to the opportunity tO>
prepare, the belligerent on the offensive would often be
influenced to declare 'var suddenly or in advance o£ a
period which n1ight otherwise elapse.
Prof. Westlake's opinion.-Pro£. J. Westlake ·said
concerning the Second Hague Convention relative to·
the opening o£ hostilities :
This regulation coinddes with the doctrine which we have laid
down aboYe. Only two remarks are needed in order to put the
matter in a clear light. One is that the declaration of war is now
expressly required to be motiYee, which the declarants haye always made it for their own justification. The other is that the
commencement of hostilities without a preceding declaration, in
such peculiar cases as are contemplated above, is left possible·
by the faet that the parties are not made to contract that they
will not commence hostilities agninst one another otherwise than
as described, but recogni?.:e that hostilities ought not (ne doivent
pas) to be otherwise eommencecl.
Notlling can more clearly show the impossibility of insisting·
on an interval of notice between a declaration of war and a commencenlent of llostili ties under it than the fact that the very
moderate proposal of a 24 hours' inten·al, made by the delegation of the Netherlands, was not accepted. 'rhe conference has
therefore rather confirmed than ·weakened the necessity that, in
order not to be taken unprepared, every nation n1ust rely on its
own vigilance and on no formal rule. (vVestlake's Int. Law,
Part II, War, p. 267.)

Reason8 fot· Ii ague rules.-The discussion at The·
Hague in 1907 centered about the regulations in regard
to the opening o£ hostilities 'vhich had been proposed
and 'vhich followed closely those o£ the Institute o£ International Law at its season o£ 1906. As these 'vere in
their essential principle's the. sa1ne as those finally adopted,.
it is ·well to set forth the reasons £or the French proposition. The reasons £or their presentation 'vere set forth
by Gen. Amourel, one o£ the French delegates:
En commen~ant la discussion du Projet de Reglement sur·
l'ouYerture des h cstilites que la Delegation fran~aise a eu l'honueur de sonmettre a vos deliberations, il n'est sa~s doute pas
inutile qu'elle vous fournisse quelques explications de nn ture a
justifier les termes de sa proposition.
Elle estime tout d'nbord qu'il faut ecarter la supposition d'une
guerre faite sans raison serieuse etappat·l~nte, ou sans qu'il se soit
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produit au moins un incident susceptible, de donner lieu a une
discussion. Une agression en pleine paix, sans motif plausible,
n'est plus con1patible aYec le sentiment public des Etats du monde
ciYilise que nons representons ici.
La guerre nnra done ponr origine nu moins un fait. nyant une
certaine gravite, et pouYant m '-'tiver nne echange d'explications.
Alors comn1encera habituellement la periode de negociations
diploma tiques, n u cours desquelles chaque Puissance cherchera i\
obtenir de l'autre des conditions propres a satisfaire ses interets.
Si l'accord ne se realise pas, l'une des Puissances pent avoir
recours a Ja menace de guerre en fixant, par voie d'ultimatum, les
concessions qu·ene exige. Elle fixe aussi, en general, un delai
de reponse, apres lequel elle se reserve de faire appel aux armes.
Quand les evenements se produisent sons cette forme, au debut
d'un conflit entre deux nations, il est bien certain que l'etat de
guerre se trouYe declare d'une fa~on suffisante: l'ultima tum porte
en lui-meme l'avertissement prealable et non equivoque; il indique
la concession exigee, et par consequent la cause de la guerre en
cas de refus; enfin, il limite n1eme la guerre dans le temps, selon
l'heureuse expression de notre excellent collegue de la Delegation
de Russie, puisque l'etat de guerre commence a la lin1ite du delai
de reponse.
)1ais n se peut que le fait, origine du conflit, ne soit pas tou~
jours suivi d'une conYersation diplomatique. Dans certains cas,
le dommage materiel on moral cause a uu Etat lui paraitra assez
graYe pour qu'il ne juge pas possible de n'en pas chercher repara~
tion par les armes. Il en est ainsi parfois dans les conflits entre
deux individus, lorsque les temoins de l'un r~oiyent mission de
reclamer uniquement nne rencontre.
Il se peut aussi que, au cours ·des negociations diplomatiques,
celles-ci prennent nne tournure telle que le reclamnnt perde tout
espoir d'obtenir par cette yoie des conditions suffisantes. Il pourra
fort bien alors rompre brusquement l'entretien, et avoir recours a
la force pour s'assurer la satisfaction qu'il juge necessaire.
Dans ces deux cas, que la guerre eclate immediatement ou
pendant les pourparlers, elle commencera par la manifestation
inopinee de la volonte expresse de l'une des Parties en presence.
~Iais il semble que, meme alors, l'ouverture des hostilites doit se
fain~ ayec les memes garanties que lorsque la guerre eclate a l~
suite d'un ultimatum.
L'avertissement prealable et non equivoque et les motifs de la
guerre se trouvent donne dans l'ultimatum lorsqu'il en est fai t
usage; nous den1andons qu'ils soierit compris dans une notification a l'adversaire. lorsque l'une des Parties prend la resolution
de co mba ttre. sans a voir commence, on epuise, la discussion dipq
lorna tique.
Il n'est pas necessaire de justifier la condition que l'a vertissement doit etre non equivoque . . Il devra aussi etre prealable.
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Nous entendons par l:l qu'il doit preceder les hostilites. l\iais
celles-ci pen vent commencer des que l'a v~rtissement sera 11aryenu
a l'adYersaire. La limitation de la guerre clans le temps sera
ainsi moins nettement determinee que dans le cas de I' ultima ttun.
Nous estimons, en effet, que les necessites de ln guerre moderne ne
V<~ rm e ttent pa~ de demnnder, a celui qui rr la yolonte d'a ttaquer,
cl'autres delnis que ceux qui sont absolurnent indispensables pour
que son ac1Yersa1re sache que la force va etre employee contre lui.
Nons pensons nussi que la declaration de gnerre doit etre
llJOtiYee; cette condition nous semble pouvoir etre facilement acceptee, parce que les Puissances, ne se decidant a combattre que
lorsqu'elles sont bien conYaincues de leur droit, ne peuvent
hesiter a le vroclamer publiquemeut. En outre, il est particulieremeut utile que les motifs de la gueire ~oieut portes a la
connaissnnce des l~:ta ts non meles n u '~oufli t mais qui vout en
souffrir, et qui ont le droit de sa Yoir pourquoi ils souffrent. Enfin,
ces n1emes l~tats, s'ils sont au courant (1es causes de la guerre,
seront peut-etre mieux disposrs a offrir leurs bons offices, tout en
respedant les interets en presence.
Ainsi. se tronYent expliques les tennes de l'nrticle rr de notre
Projet de Reglement. Quant a !'article 2, il YOUS pal:aitrn sans
doute necessnire que l'etat de guerre, qui n'interesse pas seulement les belligerants, ma is qui npporte a ussi un grand trouble
clans les affaires des pays neutres, soit notifie le plus tot 11ossible
a ceux-ci.
Cela n'est-il pas d'ailleurs necess;t ire si ron yeut mettre les
neutres en mesure de remplir le rOle que leur reseryeut les articles
6 et 27 de ln Conyention du 28 juillet 189!)'?
Tels sont, l\fessienrs, les motifs que la DeH~gation franr,aise avait
a vous exposer a l'appui de sa vroposition, et el1e serait heureuse
que cel1e-ci put receYoir votre 11ssentiment. (Denxieme Conference Interna tiounle. Tome III, p. 168.)

The general report, presented after the co1nmittee had
fully considered the question of coininencement of hostilities and formulated the regulations, does not add
1nuch to the reasons stated by the representative of the
French delegation. (Deuxie1ne Conference Internationale, To1ne I, pp. 131-136.)
Form of declaration of war.-A revie'v of the forms
of statement of declarations of 'var shows that no one
form has been follo,ved. Certain requisites are evident.
'The declaration havjng the effect of changing the relations of the states in such a far-reaching 1nanner 1nnst
be n1ade by a co1npetent authority and to a con1petent
authority. 'rhe con1petent authority InaY be deter1nined,
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by the don1estic· hnv of a state as in the United States
" Congress has po\\rer to declare war."
The declaration should be unequivocal. ~he change
of relations from peace to \Var should not be a n1atter
o:f uncertainty. All parties 'vho n1ay be affected by the
existence of 'var have a right to know the fact.
A notice prior to the co1nn1encement o£ hostilities
should be given as the dat.e at 'vhich acts of hostility
becon1e valid should be established before rather than
after the act or by the act.
_.._-\s 'var is in itself so serious it is generally held that
there should be a reason for ·'var and that the state entering upon hostilities should announce the reason. Of
course, it is well understood that the apparent 1nay not
always be the real reason, and so1netin1es it 1night be best
:for all parties that the reason be not too fully stated lest
it 1nake return to peace 1nore difficult.
The declaration should of course be public and fonnal~
as the conduct of foreign states is also influenced by the
state o.f \Var. These essentials of the fonn of a ·declara6on of \Yar are si1nple and necessary in order that it
1nay be valid and fnlly operative, Yiz, the declaration of
"\Var should be fron1 the con1petent authority. in an unequivocal forn1, and published prior to the coininencen1ent of hostilities, and should give a reason for the 'var.
Suggestions as to other requiren1ents for a valid declaration haYe been 1nade, such as that the causes should be
stated in full, 2± hours or son1e' 1ninin1lUn of ti1ne should
elapse bet,veen the publication of the declaration and
its opera ti.on~ etc. l_,~1ese have not yet 1·eceived sufficient
support to be regarded as essential.
The declaration should therefore be:
1. Fron1 the competent authority.
2. To the cotnpetent authority.
3. Previous to the opening of hostilities.
4. Explicit and unequiYocal.
5. Reasoned.
The 1netliod of notifying a neutral in order that there
1nay be as little difference in interpretation as possible
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should be a simple transn1ission to the proper neutral
authority of a copy of the declaration made to the enemy.
Resume.-The survey of practice and opinion indicates
that the rules proposed in 1907 at the conference at The
Hague reflected general opinion. Any 'vide departure
fron1 these rules 'vould not at present receive. much sanction. l\1ost authorities contend that the main aim is to
kno'v definitely 'vhen 'var begins, if 'var is to be undertaken, <lnd to kno'v son1ething of the reason for the war.
Considering this condition of affairs the follo,ving Hague
rules are thought sufficient:
REGULA1l'IONS.
ARTICLE 1. Ilostilities bet\veen the contracting powers must not
commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form
either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultima tum with
conditional declaration of war.
ART. 2. The state of war must be notified to the neutral powers
without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until
after the receipt of a notification, which may even be given by
telegraph. Neutral powers, nevertheless, can not plead the ab·
sence of notification if it is established beyond doubt that they
were in fact a ware of the state of war.
ART. 3. Article 1 of the present convention shall take effect in
case of war between two or more of the contracting powers.
Article 2 is binding as between a belligerent power, which is a.
party to the convention, and neutral powers, which are also
parties to the convention.

TOPIC

III.

LI::\IITATION OJ<' AR::\IAl\IENTS .

"'Vhat attitude should be assun1ed in regard to the limitation o£ armaments?
CONCLUSION.

In view o£ the evident differences o£ opinion and difficulties the wish expressed at 1"'he Hague in 1907 n1ay be
reaffirmed, viz, that the Governments " examine the possibility o£ an agreement as to the lin1itation o£ armed
forces by land and sea and o£ war budgets."
NOTES.

'

General.-Fron1 the days o£ the saying that " all things
are £air in war " there has developed in modern tin1es
a very decided opinion to the contrary. Restrictions upon
the means and n1ethods o£ injuring the enemy have been
in1posed. l\1any plans £or doing a way with the evils o£
war have been proposed.
·
On August 24, · 1898, the Russian Czar caused his
minister to hand to the diplomatic representatives at St.
Petersburg a rescript which set forth the dangers o£ increasing armaments, and stated thatr_ro put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the
means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the
whole world-such is the supreme duty which is to-day imposed
on all states.
Filled with this idea, His l\1ajesty bas been pleased to order
me to propose to all the Governments, whose representatives are
accredited to the Imperial Court, the meeting of a confereuce
which would have to occupy itself with this grave problem.
This conference should be, by the help of God. a happy presage
for the century which is about to open. It would converge in
one powerful focus the efforts of all states which are sincerely
seeking to make the great idea of universal peace triumph over
the elements of trouble and discord.
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